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Lil1Strategic Pacing and the Progress Trap of Innovation 
 
Abstract 
 
To what extent can the Strategic Pacing of Innovations (SPI) mitigate the Progress Trap of 
Innovations (PTI) that leads to diminishing returns to scope from timing innovation releases too 
fast or too slow? This research-in-progress paper incorporates economic and strategy concepts 
to conceptually surface (i) the need to balance existing product-line servicing with innovative 
new-releases, (ii) the strategic choice of timing a new release to maintain returns to scope, (iii) 
costs of overshooting or undershooting from SPI and its relationship to PTI, and (iv) internal and 
external contingencies that influence the impact of SPI on PTI. To the best of our knowledge, a 
similar framework has been hitherto missing in the literature on innovation.  
  
Keywords: Strategic Pacing, Innovation Timing, Progress Trap of Innovations, Strategic 
Innovation. 
	  
Introduction	  
Why is it that, although Microsoft releases its OS innovations (Windows OS) once every 
seven months and Apple releases its OS innovations (Mac OS) once every fifteen months, 
Apple’s Mac OS steadily attracts a larger market share (NetMarketShare.com, 2012)? Similarly, 
why is it that, RIM Blackberry, once a corporate mainstay mobile device, has steadily lost 
market share to Apple iPhone and Google Android devices? While it is commonplace for 
businesses in a competitive environment to overemphasize innovation releases or 
overemphasize servicing existing products, either strategy can leave companies overwhelmed. 
This article talks about how companies need to strategically release their innovations to the 
market, maintaining a delicate balance between offering services for their existing products and 
driving innovations to constantly whet the market’s appetite for novelty.  
The central theme of this research-in-progress is dispelling the myth that innovation 
releases at breakneck speed or maintaining a status quo with a profitable innovation always 
offers increasing returns to scope1. Instead, we combine economics and strategy to contend 
that companies who fail to strategically pace their innovation releases fall prey to a “progress 
trap of innovation” (PTI). We define PTI as a phenomenon where a marginal innovation within a 
product line offers diminishing returns to scope.  
PTI, as a phenomenon, requires particular scrutiny in a competitive environment. 
Innovations establish benchmark standards for companies, competitors and consumers. A 
perceived gap between expectations and innovation offerings can erode a company’s market 
advantage. For example, Apple’s release of its iOS 6 as a marginal innovation to its iOS product 
line was negatively perceived by the market. The market expected greater iPhone hardware 
changes and fewer changes to the iOS (including replacing Google Maps with Apple Maps). 
Given that Apple’s iOS releases had become a benchmark for its consumer’s product/service 
line expectations, this negative perception precipitated into diminishing returns to scope. 
It is well established in literature that too many innovations, too fast, can results in being 
”too much of good thing” (Barnett and Freeman 2001). Tony Scott, the CIO of Disney remarked 
that there are limits to how much innovations a customer can absorb over time. Much like 
adding the 37th button on a remote (Anthony 2008), companies that release innovations too fast 
without allowing for market maturity for existing releases can overshoot consumer and market 
expectations by overwhelming the market with frequency of releases. Similarly, an inability to 
innovate on time can erode a company’s competitiveness. Therefore, in order to mitigate PTI, 
companies need to practice strategic pacing of innovations (SPI). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  While	  returns	  to	  scale	  focus	  on	  cost	  efficiencies	  from	  producing	  more	  of	  the	  same	  product/service	  (by	  distributing	  fixed	  costs	  over	  more	  
units),	  innovations	  within	  a	  product	  line	  rely	  on	  returns	  to	  scope	  that	  focuses	  on	  cost	  efficiencies	  from	  reusing	  the	  same	  base	  of	  knowledge	  to	  
offer	  innovative	  new-­‐releases	  within	  the	  same	  product/service	  line.	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We define SPI as a mechanism by which companies formally plan their innovation 
releases to the market with considerations of internalities and externalities. Internalities require 
balancing innovative R&D with service standards for existing product portfolios. Externalities 
require balancing competitive pressures with market expectations. Thus, strategic pacing is not 
a call for not innovating; rather, it highlights the need for strategically timing innovation releases 
for an existing product/service line.  
This research-in-progress offers a conceptual framework for understanding relationship 
between SPI and PTI and the contingencies therein. In scoping our discussion to the strategic 
pacing of technological innovations, the framework surfaces the darker side of breakneck 
innovation, a phenomena of significance to industry and practice, but one that has escaped 
scrutiny.  
 
Underpinnings and Framework Development 
Innovations are significant investments for a firm, even when allowing for economics of 
scope to defray some costs of another innovation iteration on the same product line.  The 
cumulative profit for an entire product line rises and falls over time as new innovations are 
developed and as revenues from sales of existing product lines slow down.  When revenues are 
considered in conjunction with initial R&D costs as well as initial service stand up and ongoing 
service related costs we depict the cumulative curve over multiple product iterations in figure 1. 
The critical consideration for SPI thus becomes the appropriate timing for T2, T5…  so as to 
maximize profitability from SPI calculated as areas under the curves B-A by trying to reduce the 
profitability drops in points such as T4 and T5.   
	  
Figure	  1:	  Cumulative	  Profitability	  of	  Innovation	  new	  release	  iterations	  
Strategic Pacing of Innovations (SPI) 
The proposed framework in this paper is underpinned by the macroeconomic concept of 
Production Possibility Frontier (PPF). PPF is a well-established economic model that shows the 
tradeoff between two competing resources, thus allowing for efficient resource allocation under 
conditions of opportunity costs and capital constraints. Given resource constraints, a company 
has to forego resource allocations in one area for another. This theory is particularly relevant to 
our research because of the following reasons. First, given an existing product line, investments 
in one more new technology innovation to an existing product line has an opportunity cost. This 
opportunity cost arises from foregoing investments from promoting and servicing the existing 
portfolio. Second, the PPF is central to our understanding of how sub-optimal allocation of 
resources (including investments) can degrade the value of a product line portfolio, leading to 
Cumulative	  Profit	  
B	  
A	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diminishing returns to scope. For example, before Microsoft Windows XP had reached maturity 
in adoption, the release of Windows Vista required Microsoft to divest resources from better 
promoting and servicing existing Windows XP customers to promoting and servicing Windows 
Vista as a new release. This sub-optimal allocation degraded the Windows product line portfolio 
with customers perceiving Windows Vista as a hasty release in a market where Windows XP 
had yet to reach maturity.  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Innovation	  Adoption	  Possibility	  Frontier	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  PPF	  &	  Returns	  (R)	  from	  SPI	  Scenarios 
As noted earlier, SPI requires a deliberate yet delicate balancing of innovation-centric 
R&D (I) and servicing the existing product line (S). Contemporary research has often 
accustomed itself to an exclusionary conflict from considering scale economics (less new 
releases and more efficient servicing; S>I) or scope economics (diverse new releases where 
innovation I>S) (figure 2). In a study regarding proper product line diversity a business should 
Case 3: (II) 
	  
RCase 3 > RCase 2 >RCase 1 
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follow, Bergh (2008) notes that the apparent exclusionary conflict between scale (efficiency) and 
scope (diversity) economics is incomplete and is best understood when considered together. 
Thus, adapting the PPF for this discussion, the Innovation Adoption Possibility Frontier (Figure 
2) shows that the optimal resource combination is when I=S. For I>S, returns will be sub-optimal 
because resource investments and allocations for a new innovation release will result in 
foregoing investments and allocations for service obligations for existing products/services. For 
S>I, returns are also sub-optimal from the opportunity costs of foregoing innovations to 
competitors.  
 
Proposition 1: For a company with an existing product/service line, optimal investments in 
resource allocation is achieved when I=S and is sub-optimal when I>S or S>I.   
 
Figure 3 shows Returns (R) from various Innovation Release timings. The S-shaped 
curve for each case denotes the marginal market returns from an existing innovation over time- 
from increasing marginal returns after inception to decreasing marginal returns after maturity. 
Rcase 1 shows the area under the curve as returns from releasing the next innovation in the 
product line. In Case 1, releasing an innovation before the adoption matures reduces R. In Case 
3, a late innovation release increases R but makes the product line vulnerable to competitive 
erosion. Case 2 shows an approximately appropriate timing for a new innovation release at the 
point of market adoption maturity and the beginning of diminishing marginal returns.  
 
Proposition 2: For a company with an existing product/service line, optimal returns from SPI can 
be achieved when a new innovation is released at the point of market maturity. An early or late 
release will reduce R such that an early release will forego increasing marginal returns to scope 
and a late release will forego marginal returns from competitive erosion.    
 
Combining the Innovation Adoption Possibility Frontier investments (F, F*, F**) in 
resource allocation to SPI scenarios in Figure 2, point B shows the closest allocation of I=S 
while I>S for point A and S>I for point C. Therefore, we argue: 
 
Proposition 3: Optimal returns to scope can be achieved at point B when the Adoption 
Possibility Frontier (F*) balances resource investments and when SPI is at the point of maturity. 
 
Impact of Strategic Pacing of Innovations (SPI) on the Progress Trap of Innovations (PTI) 
Perceived value of an innovation release is central to customer adoption and plays a 
major role in avoiding PTI costs. In practicing SPI, companies must fully understand the pace of 
customer adoption and market diffusion. It is important for the firm to allow adequate time 
between releases to allow the market to fully accept the previous product. While too long a 
window will erode competitiveness, a small window of time between innovations may lead to a 
customer’s reluctance to purchase the new innovation. Moreover, too frequent innovation 
releases create a deflationary pressure. If customers believe that another innovation release is 
expected too soon, it may defray adoption of lessen the value of the existing innovation yet to 
mature. Even more so, it can lead to cannibalization with the new product line innovation 
stealing sales revenues from a previous innovation that is yet to mature.  
Research shows that timing of innovations is linked to product success (Kessler and 
Bierly 2002), without which companies have to incur PTI costs. For example, strategic timing 
research by Sharma (1999) and Savetpanuvong et. al (2011) link innovation timing to “long-term 
cost reduction via appropriate use of resources, risk management to ensure immunity against a 
negative future, and timely entry into different market cycles” (Savetpanuvong et. al., 2011). 
This research offers a relevant corollary on overshooting and undershooting as central to PTI. In 
overshooting, too-early or too-short a release cycle can lead to a company driving away their 
customers who tire of an ever-shortening product upgrade cycle. For example, while IBM was 
one of the first to enter the PC market during the early 1990’s, the innovation was too early and 
overshot the market adoption and diffusion. IBM was unable to capitalize on its innovative entry 
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and a multitude of competitors capitalized on strategically pacing their market entry (e.g. 
Packard Bell, Dell, Gateway) in line with adoption trends.  Conversely, in undershooting, 
releasing innovations to the market too slowly can drive away customers who switch to 
competitive products which satisfy their adoption demands at a more expected pace. For 
example, Nintendo’s inability to release innovative new releases for its Wii product line for over 
7 years led to undershooting and cost Nintendo its competitiveness to gaming consoles such as 
Sony PS3 and Microsoft Xbox.  
Overshooting or undershooting a new innovation release to an existing product line can 
have detrimental PTI effects. Innovations require diffusion and adoption to be successful and 
provide returns to scope. Jensen’s (1982) “decision-theoretic model of individual firm adoption 
behavior which can be used to derive an expected diffusion curve…” highlight the need for 
aligning the trajectories of innovation and adoption. Notwithstanding early or late adopters as 
tails in a probability distribution, markets and customers have a specific pace of adoption and 
diffusion. For example, Smartphone adopters may expect specific Smartphone innovations new 
releases to be strategically paced with their 2-year carrier contracts. Overshooting can happen 
when too many significant new releases to the product line occur before contract expiry. There 
is value for a firm that can practice a distinguished waiting period before further releases (Choi 
et al. 1998). Similarly, undershooting can happen when no significant new releases are 
introduced after the contract expiry, opening the field for competitors (Figure 4). Therefore we 
argue: 
	  
Figure	  4:	  Adoption	  and	  Diffusion	  Gaps 
Proposition 4: SPI overshooting or undershooting the pace of consumer adoption and diffusion 
increases PTI costs. 
 
SPI Contingencies 
Internal Contingencies 
An empirical study of post-acquisition innovation performance of Google and Yahoo by 
Datta et al (2013) found that the (i) Type and (ii) Emphasis of an innovation has significant 
impact on innovation timing. Following Datta et al (2013), we dimension Innovation Type into 
radical and incremental innovation. Dewar and Dutton (1986) forwarded the notion of 
“radicalness” as the distribution of fundamentally-different, revolutionary shifts in innovations 
within the same product/service line. Incremental innovations, on the other hand, are minor 
improvements and adjustments in innovations within the same product/service line. Using the 
Apple iPod line as an example, iPod Touch was a radical innovation while iPod Video was an 
incremental innovation.  Companies’ product lines that practice incremental innovation can add 
a few enhanced features to innovative new releases with relatively lower PTI costs owing to a 
lower probability of overshooting or undershooting the SPI. On the other hand, companies that 
practice radical innovation can “punctuate” the adoption and diffusion equilibrium and overshoot 
or undershoot its SPI, leading to higher PTI costs. By releasing radical innovations a company 
can cause angst within the consumers by increasing learning curve costs. Apple Maps 
introduced in iOS 6.0 offers ample evidence when a radical new release to the iOS platform on 
the iPhone 5 undershot the adoption and diffusion pace. The Maps release highlighted PTI 
costs that eroded Apple’s market capitalization even when the iPhone 5 release had an optimal 
SPI. While Apple Maps provided added features (e.g. Fly-by) and usability, Apple Maps 
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increased adoption and diffusion costs for a product with minor glitches undershooting its SPI. 
Thus we, contend: 
Proposition 5: The relationship between SPI and PTI is moderated by innovation type such that 
SPI overshooting or undershooting for radical innovations is more likely to incur higher PTI costs 
than for incremental innovations 
 
Innovation Emphasis is dimensioned in product or process innovations (Datta et al 
2013). Product innovation relates to building artifacts or prototypes, both radical and 
incremental. 
	  
Figure	  5:	  Innovation	  Type	  and	  Scope	  Matrix 
Process innovation knowledge relates to creating novel ways of performing an activity or 
service (Datta et al 2013). A process innovation, such as a change in Google’s search 
algorithm, whether radical or incremental, remains for the most part, server-side, transparent 
and behind the scenes with negligible adoption and diffusion costs. The search page looks the 
same even though the search algorithm may have been changed. In contrast, product 
innovations require more “buy in” from consumers with marked adoption and diffusion. 
Therefore, a product/service line that emphasizes more on product innovations is more exposed 
to SPI overshooting or undershooting, leading to higher PTI costs.  
 
Proposition 6: The relationship between SPI and PTI is moderated by the innovation emphasis 
such that SPI overshooting or undershooting for product innovations is more likely to incur 
higher PTI costs than for process innovations 
 
External Contingency 
In his famous treatise, Schumpeter (1934) remarked on the role of innovations in 
technology firms where “waves of creative destruction” can originate from within the firm or from 
its competitors aiming to capitalize on abnormal rents. In considering technology innovations, 
lower barriers to entry have led to heightened competitive pressures. Given that every firm 
enters the market with its innovations at different times, SPI has to consider competitive 
pressures from substitute product/service innovations from rivals. For example, Apple’s iPad 
mini release was timed to counter market shares from holiday sales of Samsung Galaxy III and 
Amazon’s Kindle Fire HD. Because competitive pressures often force company’s to respond 
faster in a way that can deviate from its original planned innovation release, it increases the 
likelihood of SPI overshooting or undershooting, thus exposing itself to higher PTI costs. For 
example, the iPad competitive boom forced companies such as Dell and RIM Blackberry to 
release their own tablets, Dell Streak and Blackberry Playbook. However, both tablets 
undershot the SPI and significantly added to their PTI costs. Thus, we contend:    
. 
Proposition 7: The relationship between SPI and PTI is moderated by innovation 
competitiveness such that SPI overshooting or undershooting for product lines with more 
competitors will incur higher PTI costs than for product lines with fewer competitors.  
 
Conclusion and Future Research Agenda 
 This research-in-progress combines economic and strategic considerations in planning 
and practicing innovation new-releases to an existing product line. The research tries to answer 
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specific questions that have escaped scrutiny but offers tremendous research and practical 
relevance. First, is there and what is an optimal innovation new release timing for a specific type 
of technology portfolio? What is the optimal balance between allocating resources to maintain 
service quality (servqual) for existing product and practicing innovation new releases? To what 
extent does overshooting or undershooting vary in assessing PTI costs? And, how can firms 
strategically plan for internal and external contingencies in choosing resource allocations for its 
innovation/service portfolio? The research is currently collecting data on tablets (Apple and 
Amazon) and Smartphone hardware and software (Apple, Samsung (uses Google Android), 
and Nokia) to (i) mathematically model and analyze optimal SPI based on historical post-release 
profitability and (ii) a positivist comparative case study to build a grounded theory to surface 
further insights on the relationship and contingencies between Strategic Pacing and the 
Progress Trap of Innovations.  
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